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Abstract 
Rational choice theory (RCT) models decision makers as utility maximizers and is often 
defended via an as-if argument. According to this argument, although real individuals do 
not consciously maximize their utility function, their choices can be explained as if they 
were generated by utility maximization. An alternative model is random-choice, which as-
sumes that decision makers pick up an element from a given set according to a uniform dis-
tribution on the set. In this paper we examine a series of experiments that compare RCT 
and the random-choice model as alternative explanations of consumer demand, and investi-
gate how these experiments contribute to clarifying the actual scope of RCT and the short-
comings of the standard as-if defense of it. 
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1. Introduction 
In mainstream economics, Rational Choice Theory (RCT) designates the theory according 
to which individuals choose among the available options to maximize their utility. More 
extensively, RCT assumes a decision maker to be rational if her preferences are complete 
and transitive, and she chooses her most preferred option. Preferences are not restricted 
with respect to their orientation, and can be selfish, altruistic, masochistic or religiously ori-
ented. If continuous, the preferences of a rational decision maker can be represented by a 
utility function, and her choices can be viewed as the result of utility maximization. This is 
the basic version of RCT that applies to consumer demand theory. RCT becomes more so-
phisticated when uncertainty, strategic interactions or intertemporal decisions are taken into 
account, but investigation of these aspects is beyond the scope of this paper.1 
Many have criticized RCT as psychologically unrealistic. For instance, Herbert Simon and 
other scholars have contended that actual decision makers lack the cognitive capacities to 
solve the maximization problem hypothesized by RCT. As a defense against the criticism 
of unrealism, supporters of RCT have often adopted the as-if argument popularized in eco-
nomics by Milton Friedman (1953). According to this argument, it is not the case that ac-
tual decision makers consciously maximize their utility function when choosing. Instead, it 
is the economist who rationalizes the decision maker’s choices as if they were generated by 
utility maximization. Therefore, the utility function and its maximization are in the econo-
mist’s mind rather than in the decision maker’s, so that the psychology of the latter is not at 
issue. As far as the decision maker’s observed choices are in accord with those implicated 
by RCT, the theory is validated. 
However, the as-if defense of RCT has also been challenged. Philosophers disputed the 
conventionalist or instrumentalist views of scientific theories usually associated to the as-if 
argument.2 Psychologists and behavioral economists provided robust experimental evi-
dence suggesting that RCT is not validated by observed choices.3 The present paper ad-
dresses the as-if defense of RCT in its consumer-demand version from a further angle, 
namely that involving random choice. 
A decision maker chooses at random when he picks up an alternative in his choice set ac-
cording to a uniform distribution on the set, so that each alternative in the set has an equal 
probability to be selected. In particular, we will consider consumers who pick up at random 
a bundle among those that exhaust their whole income, i.e., a bundle on their budget line or, 
                                                 
1
 For a presentation of consumer-demand RCT, see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995, chapters 1-3. 
2
 See among others Nagel 1963, Caldwell 1980, Musgave 1981, Hausman 1992. 
3
 See for instance Tversky and Thaler 1990, and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991. 
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when more than two goods are available, budget hyperplane. Random decision makers can 
be easily constructed by computer, and are often employed in agent-based computational 
economics.4 
One may expect rational and random decision makers to behave very differently. In con-
trast, Gary Becker (1962) pointed out that some implications of RCT for demand behavior 
can be obtained on average even if consumers choose in a random way. Becker’s article 
was seminal to a series of recent experiments that employ the random-choice model as an 
alternative hypothesis in testing the extent to which consumer demand behavior satisfies 
RCT. In the present paper we review six of the most relevant among these experiments and 
investigate how they contribute to clarifying the actual scope of RCT as well as the short-
comings of the standard as-if defense of it.5 
The experiments show that consumers often violate RCT and hence suggest that it is diffi-
cult to see human demand behavior as if generated by RCT. At best one might defend an 
“almost RCT”, claiming that most individuals choose as if they were nearly rational. More-
over, the number of violations varies strongly from experiment to experiment and this hints 
that the explanatory power of RCT is very much context-dependent. The problem is that 
there is no meta-theory stating in which contexts RCT works and in which ones it does not. 
With respect to the as-if argument, the experiments reinforce Becker’s article in bringing to 
light the simple but often overlooked fact that there are two types of as-if defenses of a sci-
entific theory. While the weak as-if defense states that a theory offers a possible explanation 
of the phenomenon at hand, the strong as-if defense claims that the theory provides the best 
explanation of it in terms of fit with experimental data, simplicity or other relevant quali-
ties. The very possibility of an as-if-random explanation of consumer demand makes clear 
that the standard as-if defense only provides a weak epistemological support to RCT, and 
does not rule out that different models of choice, such as random-choice, may provide an 
alternative explanation. 
The problem is not the weak defense per se, for it is well understood that the same phe-
nomenon can be explained by two or more different theories. One may even claim that 
since theory and the real world are necessarily dissimilar, any scientific theory constitutes 
an as-if rational reconstruction of the world. But it is precisely the presence of multiple as-if 
explications that limits the epistemological force of the weak as-if defense and calls for se-
lecting one theory as the best explication at hand. 
Becker did not raise this problem in his article, though, and the subsequent experiments 
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5
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were also oriented by the weak as-if defense of RCT. Indeed they are designed to falsify or 
validate RCT and do not investigate whether RCT explains human demand behavior better 
than the random-choice model. As a consequence of the weak-defense attitude, the explana-
tory power of the random-choice model has never been really investigated in the literature. 
The gap between the weak and the strong as-if defense of RCT is particularly relevant when 
policy issues are at stake, for instance if policy makers aim to influence consumers’ deci-
sions about smoking, drinking, or buying healthy food. The circumstance that RCT offers a 
possible explanation of demand behavior (weak defense) is not sufficient to argue that a 
RCT policy, e.g. an incentive-based policy, is the most effective one. By the same argu-
ment one could also claim that since the random-choice model provides another possible 
as-if explanation of consumer behavior, then incentives would prove ineffectual and differ-
ent policies should be adopted, e.g. a paternalistic policy imposing severe restrictions on the 
consumers’ choice set. In order to argue that a RCT-based policy is the most effective one, 
one would need to make a strong case for RCT, that is, to show that RCT offers the best as-
if explanation of consumer behavior among the various explanations at hand. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates why random choice 
has become a focal point for research on RCT. In Section 3 we present Becker’s approach 
to random behavior and discuss his main results and claims. In Section 4 we review the six 
experiments that test RCT by using the random-choice model as an alternative hypothesis, 
while in Section 5 we discuss their main findings and the import of the latter for our re-
search questions. Section 6 sums up and concludes. 
 
2. Random, boundedly rational, and rational choice 
As the number of theoretically admissible alternatives to RCT is infinite, one wonders why 
much experimental research focuses on random choice rather than, for instance, some mod-
el of bounded rationality. In effect, it could be argued that random choice is as unrealistic as 
RCT, since assuming that each alternative has an equal probability of being selected also 
calls for unlikely cognitive skills. Furthermore, it can be observed that random behavior can 
be regarded as a special case of rational behavior when the decision maker’s preferences 
are represented by a flat utility function. Since in this case all alternatives maximize his 
utility, the agent is rational in picking one at random; but if the random-choice model is just 
a special case of RCT, comparing the two would not be very illuminating. These criticisms 
notwithstanding, random choice has some attractive features that make it a natural focal 
point for research on RCT. 
 4 
First, if one excludes the trivial case of a flat-utility decision maker, random choice appears 
to contrast rational choice in a way that boundedly-rational choice does not. In spite of all 
their differences, RCT and the various theories of bounded rationality share in fact an intui-
tive idea of rationality according to which decision makers attempt to use their scarce re-
sources as well as possible to attain their ends. While utility maximizers manage to employ 
their resources in an optimal way, boundedly rational agents adopt some heuristic that gen-
erally results in a sub-optimal use of resources. In random choice, on the contrary, the in-
tentional and instrumental aspects of rationality are missing, for random decision makers do 
not seem to have intentions and ends, and in any case they do not use their resources as in-
struments to attain their ends. As far as rational choice entails maximal efficiency in the use 
of resources while in random choice efficiency is not even pursued and can easily be at a 
minimum, random choice appears as the opposite of rational choice. Hence if an economic 
phenomenon can be explained as the result of either random or rational decision, is seems 
to be due to factors that are unrelated to rationality. This makes the random-choice model 
an important reference point for research about RCT. 
Second, even if RCT and the random-choice hypothesis can be viewed as opposite in the 
sense illustrated above, in effect both models frame choice as picking up an alternative 
from an exogenously given set. This markedly differs from the established practice of 
bounded-rationality theorists who often model the choice set as endogenously determined 
by the choice process itself, in the belief that the discovery of available alternatives is an 
essential part of the process. The circumstance that RCT and the random-choice model 
frame choice in a similar way makes the comparison between them easier. 
Third, since there are many different theories of bounded rationality but none of them 
seems to have a definite pre-eminence over the others, it is not obvious which one should 
be compared with RCT. Random choice provides instead a clear-cut benchmark to be con-
trasted with RCT. 
It is true that there exist some degrees of freedom also in the definition of random choice, 
and more exactly in the specification of the choice set from which random agents pick up 
an alternative. For instance, John Chant (1963) put forward a version of random behavior in 
which the decision maker chooses among goods rather than bundles, in such a way that any 
unit of the available goods has an equal chance of being selected, independently of its price. 
It can be shown that random agents choosing in this way (labeled by Chant as “impulsive 
goods deciders”) rarely violate RCT.6 As a result, they are of little help in testing RCT and 
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in fact are not employed in the experimental studies discussed in Section 4. Even if one 
sticks to choice among bundles, the random consumer may be thought of as picking up a 
bundle among all those he can afford, that is, not only among the bundles on his budget hy-
perplane, but also among those below it. Although this option is feasible, all the experimen-
tal studies we consider restrict random choice to the budget hyperplane. This is because 
they test RCT under the additional assumption that consumers have locally non-satiated 
preferences, i.e., that for any consumption bundle x there exists another bundle y arbitrarily 
close to x which is strictly preferred to x by the consumer. Since local non-satiation implies 
that a rational consumer chooses a bundle on her budget hyperplane, comparison between 
rational and random choice requires the random consumer to pick up a bundle on his budg-
et hyperplane too. In sum, despite some degrees of freedom, defining the choice set of a 
random agent seems less arbitrary than opting for one specific model of bounded rational-
ity. Moreover, all experimental studies adopt the budget hyperplane as the choice set and 
this consensus makes arbitrariness concerns less pressing.7 
Finally, a practical advantage of random choice over bounded rationality is that it is 
straightforward to build a computer program that generates random agents, while construct-
ing artificial agents that follow boundedly rational decision rules can be much trickier. 
 
3. Random and rational behavior in Becker 1962 
3.1 Becker’s results 
A rational consumer with locally non-satiated preferences chooses a bundle on his budget 
hyperplane, and among other things his demand displays a negative substitution effect. This 
means that when prices change and the rational consumer is compensated so that at the new 
prices she can just afford the bundle she chose at the old prices, her demand for the rela-
tively dearer commodities will decrease.8 A negative substitution effect is a necessary con-
dition for seeing the consumer’s choices as if generated by utility maximization. The condi-
tion is not sufficient because substitution effects involve only compensated price changes 
and a consumer could violate RCT when uncompensated price changes occur. 
Becker (1962) imagines a consumer who chooses a bundle on his budget hyperplane in a 
random way, and compares the implications of this random decision rule with those of 
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 For further discussion on the different possible types of random behavior, see Harbaugh, Krause, and Ber-
ry 2001, and Andreoni and Harbaugh 2008. 
8
 Becker considers Slutsky’s compensations. With Hicksian compensations, instead, the consumer is com-
pensated so that her utility level is kept constant when prices change. Both kinds of compensations induce 
negative substitution effects, but Slutsky’s are those used in empirical studies because they can be deter-
mined even without knowing the consumer’s utility function. 
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RCT. Becker considers the two-commodity case so that in his paper the budget hyperplane 
comes down to the more familiar budget line, but this restriction involves no loss of gener-
ality. As a random consumer has an equal chance of choosing any bundle on the budget 
line, he is expected to pick up the bundle laying at the midpoint of the line. When the con-
sumer has income I and faces prices px and py, the midpoint has coordinates (I/2px, I/2py), 
which means that the random agent is expected to consume quantity I/2px of commodity x 
and quantity I/2py of commodity y. This may also be seen by observing that in selecting a 
bundle on the budget line the consumer is implicitly choosing what fraction of his income 
he is going to spend on each commodity. Since he chooses following a uniform distribu-
tion, he is expected to spend an equal fraction of his income on each good and so to pur-
chase I/2px of x and I/2py of y.9 
In Figure 1, the initial budget line is labeled as AB and e0, the midpoint of AB, is the bun-
dle the random consumer is expected to pick up. If commodity x becomes relatively dearer 
with respect to commodity y, the compensated budget line CD passing through e0 is steeper 
than AB. This entails that the midpoint e1 of the compensated budget line is on the left of 
e0, which in turn means that the expected compensated demand of x has decreased. There-
fore also the random-choice model implies, at least on average, that the substitution effect 
is negative. 
 
 
 
When economists study markets rather than individual behavior, they are chiefly interested 
in consumers’ aggregate and non-compensated demand, that is, in market demand. RCT 
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 Since a consumer who chooses randomly what fraction of his income to spend on each commodity and a 
consumer who chooses randomly a bundle on his budget line behave in the same way, Chant (1963) la-
beled both as “impulsive money deciders.” 
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Figure 1:  Random choice implies a 
negative expected substitution effect 
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Y 
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predicts that almost certainly the market demand curve is negatively sloped, i.e., that the 
market demand for a commodity and its price move in opposite directions. This is the so 
called “law of market demand.” Exceptions to the law are represented by Giffen goods, 
which however are rare for individual demand, and extremely implausible for market de-
mand.10 Becker notes that the random-choice model also implies the law of market demand 
with almost certainty. In fact, as observed above, a random consumer is expected to con-
sume quantity I/2px of commodity x. Therefore, when px rises and income I does not change 
(this is an uncompensated price variation), his expected consumption of x will decrease. As 
the number of random consumers on the market gets higher, the average market demand 
gets closer to the individual expected demand, so that it is almost certain that a market po-
pulated by a large number of random and uncorrelated consumers will display a negatively 
sloped demand curve. 
Becker does not see the convergence between RCT and the random-choice model with re-
spect to the sign of the substitution effect and the slope of market demand as a possible 
problem for the as-if defense of RCT. According to him, this convergence shows in fact 
that RCT and the random-choice model provide two alternative, but to a certain extent 
equally plausible as-if explanations of consumer behavior: “Households can be said to be-
have not only ‘as if’ they were rational but also ‘as if’ they were irrational.” (Becker 1962, 
p. 4) Those results can even strengthen the as-if defense of RCT, in the sense that they 
show that RCT provides a compelling as-if explanation of household behavior even if con-
sumers choose at random. 
 
3.2 Discussion of Becker’s results 
Becker’s article suggests a number of questions and comments. To begin with, the conver-
gence between rational and random consumers with respect to the sign of the substitution 
effect draws from Becker’s identification of random choice with the expected outcome of 
random choice. However the two are different: random choice means that every bundle on 
the budget line has an equal probability of being chosen, not that the midpoint bundle will 
always be chosen. In effect, if random choice is reduced to its expected outcome, a random 
consumer is indistinguishable from a rational consumer with a Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion of the form U(x, y)=x½y½, as both pick up bundle (I/2px, I/2py). Therefore, not only will 
an “expected-outcome random consumer” display a negative substitution effect, but he will 
also satisfy any necessary and sufficient condition characterizing RCT. 
On the contrary, when each and every random choice is considered the convergence be-
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 For an analysis of Giffen goods in individual and market demand see Battalio, Kagel and Kogut 1991. 
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tween rational and random consumers with respect to the sign of the substitution effect 
fades away. By looking at the compensated budget line CD in Figure 1, we notice that there 
is a probability α equal to the ratio between the length of segments e0D and CD that the 
random consumer chooses a bundle on the right of e0. Therefore, the random-choice model 
states in effect that there is a probability α that the consumer displays a positive substitution 
effect, i.e., that he violates RCT. 
An important difference between Becker’s article and the experimental studies on consumer 
demand we discuss in Section 4 is that the latter take into account each and every choice 
made by random agents, and not only the expected or average outcome of their choices. 
Becker refers to the expected outcome because his main interest lies in the negative slope of 
aggregate demand rather than in the properties of individual demand. As noticed in Section 
3.1, the expected outcome of random choice is sufficient to obtain a negatively sloped mar-
ket demand curve. The focus of the experiments discussed in Section 4 is instead on indi-
vidual demand and the rationality issues related to it. As we will see, random behavior be-
comes relevant to these topics only if all choices made by random consumers are consid-
ered. 
Becker’s conclusion that RCT and the random-choice model provide two interchangeable 
as-if explanations thus holds only for aggregate demand behavior. Even in this more cir-
cumscribed sense, Becker’s point is important for the purposes of this paper because it 
shows that the as-if argument alone provides a weak epistemological support to RCT: it on-
ly states that RCT offers a possible explanation of aggregate demand behavior and does not 
rule out that random choice may provide an alternative explanation. An as-if-random ex-
planation of aggregate demand would sound as follows: actual consumers do not choose at 
random, but it is the economist who rationalizes their choices as if they were generated by a 
random process; as far as the consumer’s observed choices are in accord with those impli-
cated by the random-choice model, this model is validated. 
A strong case for RCT would require showing not only that RCT provides a possible ex-
planation of consumer demand, but that it offers the best explanation. The epistemological 
literature has pointed out that different and often diverging elements may be taken into ac-
count to determine which theory emerges as the best explanation. On the one hand and 
quite unsurprisingly, the empirical virtues of a theory are important: the better a theory fits 
with statistical data and experimental findings the better it explains them. On the other hand 
more formal virtues of a theory, such as its simplicity, tractability, or generality, are also 
relevant in determining its explanatory power, even though they may be at variance with its 
 9 
empirical virtues. This is not the place to embark in a philosophical discussion of the best-
explanation problem.11 Here we only point out that Becker’s as-if defense of RCT does not 
take into consideration the best-explanation issue: it makes the weak case that RCT offers a 
possible explanation of demand behavior, not the strong case that RCT provides the best 
explanation of it. 
The difference between the weak and the strong as-if defense of RCT proves important not 
only from an epistemological point of view, but also when policy issues are at stake. Poli-
cies inspired by RCT, e.g. an incentive-based policy, seem often to be supported by an in-
ference of the following kind: since RCT provides an as-if explanation of consumer behav-
ior, then a RCT policy is an effective one. However, the weak as-if defense of RCT does 
not provide a sufficient footing for such an inference. By the same argument one could ar-
gue that since the random-choice model offers another possible as-if explanation of con-
sumer behavior, then incentives would be ineffectual. In order to argue that a RCT-based 
policy is effective or even the most effective one, one would need to make a strong case for 
RCT, that is, to show that RCT offers the best as-if explanation of consumer behavior 
among the various explanations at hand. 
 
4. Random and rational behavior in experiments on individual demand 
Becker compared the behavioral implications of RCT with those of the random-choice 
model, but did not test the two theories against the demand behavior of human subjects as 
recorded in laboratory experiments. In effect, when Becker published his 1962 article ex-
perimental research was still a niche thing within economics.12 More systematic efforts to 
test RCT in experiments on human demand behavior began in the 1970s, but most of the 
research was performed only after the mid 1990s. In particular, we focus here on those ex-
perimental tests of RCT that consider random choice as the alternative decision rule that 
could have generated the data recorded in the experiments. 
These experiments are very similar, so that a general illustration of their design and the role 
random behavior plays in them is in order. Each human subject participating in the experi-
ment is asked to choose the preferred bundle among those affordable to him under different 
budget/price situations, that is, with different incomes and for different commodity prices. 
The subjects’ choices are recorded, and it is checked whether they satisfy the Generalized 
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). GARP characterizes RCT in the sense that the 
choices of a subject can be seen as if generated by the maximization of a locally non-
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satiated utility function if and only if they satisfy GARP. Therefore, while a negative sub-
stitution effect is only a necessary condition to see choices as if generated by RCT, GARP 
is a necessary and sufficient condition.13 
Figures 2a-2e below give a rough geometrical intuition about which choices satisfy GARP 
and which instead violate it.14 In all Figures two budget/price situations are considered, the 
first identified by budget line AB and the second by budget line CD. It is assumed that the 
subject chooses bundle e0 in situation AB while she picks up e1 in situation CD. The choic-
es represented in Figures 2a, 2b and 2c satisfy GARP, while those in Figure 2d violate it. 
Figure 2e represents the case when the two budget/price situations coincide but the subject 
chooses e0 in AB and e1 in CD. This pattern of choice can be interpreted as a manifestation 
of the subject’s indifference between e0 and e1 and does not violate GARP. 
 
 
 
 
There is however a problem with GARP as a test for RCT: even if all recorded choices pass 
the test, this finding may provide little support for RCT. Indeed, human subjects may sat-
isfy GARP simply because in the budget/price situations they face it is extremely difficult 
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 On GARP, see Varian 1982. GARP is a modification of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(WARP) due to Samuelson 1938, and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) proposed by 
Houthakker 1950. WARP allows for cyclical choices, which are instead excluded by RCT, and excludes 
indifference curves with straight segments (the case in Figure 2e), which are compatible with RCT. SARP 
rules out cyclical choices but still excludes straight indifference curves. GARP rules out cycles and allows 
for straight indifference curves, so providing a complete behavioral characterization of RCT. 
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 The intuition is rough since cyclical choices, which are ruled out by GARP, may materialize only when at 
least three commodities and three budget/price situations are involved. 
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Figure 2d: GARP violated 
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or even impossible to violate it. For instance, it is easy to see that GARP violations become 
unlikely when the budget hyperplanes intersect near the axes, and impossible when the 
budget hyperplanes intersect on the axes or do not intersect at all. 
In statistical terms, this is the problem of the power of a test, that is, the probability of a test 
to reject the so-called null hypothesis (in our case RCT) when the hypothesis is false. To 
assess the power of GARP as a test for RCT it is necessary to formulate an alternative hy-
pothesis about the decision rule that could have generated human choices. The random-
choice model enters the scene as the alternative hypothesis usually employed in experi-
ments to assess the power of GARP as a test for RCT. The idea is that the lower the prob-
ability of GARP violations under random behavior, the lower is the power of GARP. In this 
case even if RCT is false and human subjects choose at random, they would rarely violate 
GARP.15 
In order to measure GARP’s power a further obstacle has to be overcome, though. When 
consumers choose among more than two commodities and in more than two budget/price 
situations, calculating the a priori probability of GARP violations under random behavior 
turns out to be extremely difficult. To circumvent the obstacle, experimenters use computa-
tional techniques. By Monte Carlo methods they create a large population of artificial ran-
dom agents who face the same budget/price situations the human participants in the ex-
periment were presented with. In each situation each random agent chooses a bundle on its 
budget hyperplane according to a uniform distribution. Its choices over the entire set of 
budget/price situations may or may not violate GARP. The percentage of random agents 
that violate GARP is adopted as a proxy for the a priori probability of GARP violations un-
der random behavior, and hence as a measure of the power of GARP test. If a small propor-
tion of random agents violate GARP, then the fact that also human subjects rarely violate it 
provides little support for RCT, since the rarity of human violations seems indeed due to 
the objective difficulty of violating GARP under the budget/price combinations of the ex-
periment rather than to the rational behavior of the participants.16 
It is important to stress again that in checking for GARP violations all choices made by 
random agents are taken into account, and not only the expected or average outcome of 
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 For a detailed discussion of the power of the GARP test, see Bronars 1987 and Andreoni and Harbaugh 
2008. 
16
 In addition to the percentage of random agents that violate GARP, one could also employ the percentage 
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cause this measure is univocally determined, was calculated in all experiments, and no striking new insight 
is gained by combining it with the percentage of GARP violations. 
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their choices as in Becker’s article. As observed in Section 3.2, when each and every ran-
dom choice is considered it turns out that random agents frequently violate GARP, so that 
Becker’s suggestion of a possible convergence between random and rational behavior ceas-
es to be appropriate. 
A further issue is related to the severity of GARP violations. It turns out that in all experi-
ments a number of human choices violate GARP, and this would imply that RCT is falsi-
fied by experimental data. However in many cases GARP violations are rare, in the sense 
that nearly all subjects satisfy GARP, and not severe, in the sense that violations would dis-
appear by slightly relaxing the budget constraints. In these cases one may doubt whether it 
is indeed appropriate to reject RCT. Building on the work of Sidney Afriat (1967, 1972), 
Hal Varian (1991) proposed a weakening of GARP called GARP(e) which takes into ac-
count the severity of violations through a parameter e called the Afriat Efficiency Index. 
The Afriat Efficiency Index measures the extent to which the budget constraints should be 
relaxed in order to let GARP violations disappear, and can be interpreted as indicating the 
proportion of income the subject wastes by not choosing rationally. The Index has a maxi-
mum value of one (in which case the subject satisfies GARP and no relaxation of the budg-
et constraints is needed), decreases as violations become more severe, and its minimum 
value is zero. GARP(e) with an Afriat Efficiency Index of 0.95, that is, GARP(0.95), can be 
associated to an acceptable 5% waste of income and is the one usually considered in the 
literature. So, for instance, if 99% of subjects satisfy GARP(0.95), they may be seen as 
“almost rational”, in the sense that a small relaxation in the budget constraints would render 
the near totality of them consistent with RCT. 
Like GARP, also the GARP(e) test presents a power problem. If human subjects satisfy 
GARP(e), this may not draw from their almost rational behavior, but from the fact that in 
the budget/price situations they face violations are extremely difficult. As in the case of 
GARP, random behavior is hence used to evaluate the power of GARP(e) as test for “al-
most-RCT”. 
At least six experimental works have tested RCT using the random-choice model as an al-
ternative hypothesis to assess the power of GARP and GARP(e) tests. Below we briefly 
review these works, while in Section 5 we discuss their import for our research questions. 
 
4.1 James Cox (1997) tested GARP violations using data collected by Battalio, Kagel, and 
others (1973) in an experiment conducted with 38 female patients at Central Islip State 
Mental Hospital, Long Island. The patients were part of a token economy established in the 
hospital, that is, they could earn tokens by performing janitorial works and use them to pur-
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chase goods sold within the hospital. By varying the token prices of goods, 7 different 
budget/price situations were created. The patients could choose among 16 goods that were 
grouped into 3 main categories.17 Cox included in the choice sets also labor supplies and 
token assets. Table 1 shows the percentage of GARP violations for patients at Central Islip 
and random agents, and the percentage of GARP(e) violations for e=0.95 for patients only. 
 
Table 1 – Cox 1997 
Group Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP 
Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP(0.95) 
Patients 36.8% 13.1% 
Random agents 48.2% n.a. 
 
From this table appears that a significant fraction of patients (almost 37 percent) violate 
GARP and hence RCT. Although GARP violators are more numerous among random 
agents (around 48 percent), their proportion seems comparable to that of human violators. 
The fraction of human violators shrinks to around 13 percent when GARP(0.95) is consid-
ered, but the import of this information is not clear since we do not know what happens to 
random violators with GARP(0.95). One may question the idea of testing RCT against the 
demand behavior of patients at a mental hospital, and think that with different experimental 
subjects the number of GARP violations would be significantly lower. As we will see, this 
is not the case. 
 
4.2 Reinhard Sippel (1997) tested RCT against the demand behavior of 42 students in law 
or economics at the University of Bonn, Germany. The students were offered 8 food and 
leisure goods in 10 different budget/price situations.18 Sippel ran two experiments with dif-
ferent budget/price situations, whereby experiment 1 involved 12 subjects while 30 subjects 
participated in experiment 2. Table 2 shows the percentage of students and random agents 
violating GARP and GARP(0.95) in the two experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The goods were: cigarettes, coffee, two types of candy, cookies, soda, milk, meal deal with a cigarette 
(category one); private dormitory room, private locker, grounds pass to leave the ward for a fixed period 
of time (category two); repeated use of the ground pass, clothes, weekly dance, breakfast, different rights 
such as right to use cash for packages from home (category three). 
18
 The goods were: Coca-Cola, orange juice, coffee, licorice, snacks, music videoclips, computer games, 
magazines. 
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Table 2 – Sippel 1997 
Experiment # Group Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP 
Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP(0.95) 
Law/Eco students 41.7% 8.3% Experiment 1 
Random agents 61.3% 16.8% 
Law/Eco students 63.3% 10.0% Experiment 2 
Random agents 97.3% 12.8% 
 
The proportion of GARP violators among Bonn students recorded by Sippel is larger than 
the one recorded by Cox among patients at Central Islip. In Sippel’s two experiments 24 
over 42 students, or 57 percent of them, violated GARP. In both experiments violators 
among random agents are more numerous than among students, and in experiment 2 nearly 
every random agent violates GARP. When GARP(0.95) is considered, the proportion of 
human violators shrinks noticeably, but so does the proportion of random violators. There-
fore, the power of the GARP(0.95) is negligible. One reason why Sippel recorded more 
GARP violators than Cox is that Cox grouped the goods into 3 categories, so that the data 
he collected correspond to a situation where subjects choose from 5 items (3 goods, plus 
labor supply and token assets) in 7 budget/price situations. Sippel’s students faced a more 
complicated task, since they choose from 8 items in 10 budget/price situations. 
 
4.3 Aurelio Mattei (2000) studied the demand behavior of 20 microeconomics students 
(experiment 1), 100 business students (experiment 2), and 320 readers of a consumer affairs 
magazine (experiment 3). The participants in experiment 3 received and fulfilled a ques-
tionnaire at home, and then returned it by post. In all three experiments the subjects were 
faced with 8 goods and 20 different budget/price situations.19 Table 3 shows the percentage 
of human subjects and random agents violating GARP and GARP(0.95) in the three ex-
periments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 In experiment 1 the goods were: milk chocolate, salted peanuts, biscuits, text markers, ball-point pens, 
plastic folders, writing pads, post-it. In experiment 2, milk chocolate, biscuits, orange juice, iced tea, writ-
ing pads, plastic folders, diskettes, post-it. In experiment 3, milk chocolate, biscuits, orange juice, iced tea, 
post-it, audiocassettes, ball-point pens, batteries. 
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Table 3 – Mattei 2000 
Experiment # Group Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP 
Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP(0.95) 
Micro students 25% 0% Experiment 1 
Random agents 99.4% 43.2% 
Business students 44% 4% Experiment 2 
Random agents 98.9% 43.1% 
Magazine readers 32% 2% Experiment 3 
Random agents 98.9% 42.8% 
 
Also Mattei records a significant proportion of GARP violators among human subjects (be-
tween 25 and 44 percent), but in his experiments random violators are clearly more numer-
ous. 
 
4.4 William Harbaugh, Kate Krause and Timothy Berry (2001) tested whether children 
choose rationally. They studied the demand choices of 31 second-grade students aged about 
7 years, 42 sixth-grade students aged about 11 and, for comparison, the demand choices of 
55 college undergraduates aged about 21. The choice task participants in this experiment 
were presented with was easier than the task faced by participants in the previous three ex-
perimental studies. In 11 different budget/price situations children and undergraduates were 
presented with bundles containing only 2 commodities, potato chips bags and boxes of fruit 
juice. Moreover, the subjects did not have to choose one of the infinite bundles satisfying 
the budget constraint, but were instead presented with finite choice sets including between 
3 and 7 bundles that already laid on the budget line. Table 4 shows the percentage of sub-
jects violating GARP as well as the Afriat Efficiency Index indicating how much the budg-
et constraints should be relaxed to eliminate GARP violations for the three age-groups and 
for random agents. 
 
Table 4 – Harbaugh, Krause and Berry 2001 
Group Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP 
Afriat Efficiency Index 
Second graders, age 7 74% 0.93 
Sixth graders, age 11 38% 0.96 
Undergraduates, age 21 35% 0.94 
Random agents > 98% 0.648 
 
Despite the easier task faced by children and undergraduates, Harbaugh, Krause and Berry 
found a significant portion of GARP violators in all three age-groups. From age 7 to 11 the 
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number of violators significantly decreases, while from age 11 to 21 it remains substantially 
at the same level. In no age-group GARP violations are particularly severe since they dis-
appear by mildly relaxing the budget constrains. GARP violations by random agents are 
noticeably more frequent and more severe than violations by human subjects, even for 7-
year-old children. 
 
4.5 In the experiment performed by James Andreoni and John Miller (2002), 142 students 
in economics at the University of Wisconsin and Iowa State University had to divide a giv-
en number of tokens between themselves and another subject.20 The tokens a subject kept 
for himself and those he passed to another subject were transformed into money, but possi-
bly at different exchange rates. For instance, each token kept became $0.10 while each to-
ken passed became $0.30, or vice versa. Therefore, a subject had in effect to allocate a giv-
en token income between two goods, “money for himself” and “money for another sub-
ject”, whereby the relative price of the two money-goods could be larger or smaller than 
one. By modifying the number of tokens to be divided, and the exchange rates of tokens 
into money, Andreoni and Miller presented the subjects with 8 different budget/price situa-
tions, and tested whether their preferences for giving were consistent with RCT. Table 5 
shows the percentage of GARP violations for students and random agents, and the percent-
age of GARP(0.95) violations for students only. 
 
Table 5 – Andreoni and Miller 2002 
Group Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP 
Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP(0.95) 
Economics students 9.1% 2.1% 
Random agents 78.1% n.a. 
 
Among the six experiments reviewed, this is the one that records the lowest proportion of 
human subjects violating GARP. Moreover, the power of the GARP test is satisfactory as 
violations by random agents are noticeably more frequent than violations by human sub-
jects. This favorable outcome for RCT seems in part due to the fact that participants in this 
experiment were faced with only 2 goods in 8 different budget/price situations. 
 
4.6 Philippe Février and Michael Visser (2004) tested RCT against the demand behavior of 
120 individuals from Dijon, France. The subjects were offered 6 different varieties of or-
ange juice in 5 different budget/price situations. Table 6 shows the percentage of Dijon 
                                                 
20
 Some details about the experiment are drawn from Andreoni and Miller 1998, and Andreoni and Har-
baugh 2008. 
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consumers and random agents violating GARP and GARP(0.95). 
 
Table 6 – Février and Visser 2004 
Group Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP 
Percentage of subjects 
violating GARP(0.95) 
Dijon consumers 29% 15% 
Random agents 22% 5% 
 
In this experiment GARP violators among random agents turn out to be less numerous than 
among human subjects. If one considers GARP(0.95), the number of human violators de-
creases but that of random violators shrinks even more. 
 
5. Discussion of experiments on individual demand 
As a preliminary remark, it is important to notice that in the following discussion we do not 
dispute the validity of the experimental findings reviewed above. It is always possible to 
contend that the results obtained in the laboratory are an artifact of the experimental proce-
dure itself. For instance, in the case of the last experiment one may argue that the subjects 
violated GARP because they had to choose among almost identical commodities, and this 
confounded them or even induced them to choose indeed at random. One may also main-
tain that the experiments should have been replicated to check whether GARP violations 
reduced with repetitions; if this were the case, GARP violators would not be irrational but 
only require some time to get used to choices in the lab. Although these and possibly many 
other criticisms have a point, we think that they indicate the need for further experimental 
research rather than invalidating the results obtained. Moreover, the six experimental stud-
ies reviewed above have been published in major economics journals, and this suggests that 
the economics profession acknowledges their findings as provisionally sound. 
In the first place the six experiments show that GARP violators are numerous. Violators 
range from a minimum of 9.1 percent to a maximum of 74 percent, while in most experi-
ments they are around 30-40 percent. Therefore, the standard version of RCT implying no 
GARP violations appears to be disconfirmed by experimental evidence. As a consequence, 
it appears difficult to claim that RCT provides a good explanation of choices recorded in 
the experiments, even if one adopts a weak as-if interpretation of RCT. At best an almost-
RCT, claiming that most individuals choose in a nearly rational way, could be defended. In 
effect when GARP(0.95) is considered, human violators range from a minimum of 0 per-
cent to a maximum of 15 percent and in most experiments are below 10 percent. However 
with GARP(0.95) the proportion of random violators also shrinks significantly, so that the 
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power of GARP(0.95) as test for almost-RCT is wanting. 
Another main outcome of the experiments is that the number of GARP violators varies 
strongly from experiment to experiment. This suggests that the explanatory power of RCT, 
even in its more permissive almost-RCT version, is highly context dependent. Such context 
dependency is a problem since we do not have any meta-theory stating in which contexts 
RCT works and in which ones it doesn’t. The variance in RCT’s explanatory power may 
depend on various factors, such as the amount of time available to the subjects to decide, 
the finite or nearly infinite number of bundles in their choice sets, the way or even only the 
order in which the different choice sets are presented to them. Anyhow, no clear indication 
can be drawn from the experiments. The only tendency that seems traceable is that the more 
goods and budget/price situations the subjects face, the more they violate GARP. However 
even this tendency is shallow. For instance, in Mattei’s experiment the subjects are con-
fronted with 8 goods in 20 budget/price situations while in Sippel’s they face 8 goods in 10 
situations, but Mattei generally recorded less violators than Sippel.  
A consequence of RCT’s context-dependency is that its image as a general theory of choice 
becomes less persuasive. A commonly accepted distinction between RCT and bounded-
rationality theories is that the former is one single theory with ambition to have universal 
explanatory power, while the latter constitute a whole range of different decision rules tai-
lor-made to cater particular contexts but not always transferable to other sets of circum-
stances. The experimental finding that RCT explains in a satisfactory way certain patterns 
of choice but not others, and hence appears to have at best local rather than general ex-
planatory power, makes it relatively more similar to the various theories of bounded ration-
ality than is usually assumed. 
Third, in Cox’s study, in Sippel’s experiment 1 as well as in the test performed by Février 
and Visser, the proportion of GARP violators among human subjects is significantly differ-
ent from the proportion predicted by RCT, i.e zero, and is instead quite similar to the pro-
portion of random GARP violators. For instance, in the Février-Visser experiment 29% 
percent of human subjects and 22% of random agents violate GARP. One may hence be 
tempted to infer that at least in certain situations the random-choice model explains human 
behavior better than RCT. This inference is however incorrect. The experimental evidence 
collected in those three experiments only says that human subjects and random agents vio-
late GARP (and hence RCT) in a similar proportion, not that the two groups behave in a 
similar way. Indeed, the choice patterns of humans and random agents could be highly di-
verse and the two groups may violate GARP in very different ways. For instance, humans 
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may violate GARP because they stick to previous choices and respond too weakly to price 
changes, not because they choose randomly. If this is the case, the random-choice model 
would explain human demand behavior as poorly as RCT. 
From a statistical viewpoint, this may be seen by noting that the GARP test is constructed 
to check the null hypothesis that RCT provides a good explanation of human demand be-
havior, not to check the alternative hypothesis that the random-choice model may provide 
such an explanation. To investigate this latter issue an explicit statistical test is required in 
which the null hypothesis is that the recorded choices of each human subject come from a 
uniform distribution on the subject’s choice sets, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that 
they do not. It turns out that this is a tricky problem of nonparametric statistical inference 
for which no standard test exists. Some of the difficulties draw from the fact that the sample 
space is different for each budget/price situation the subjects face, and that there is only one 
observation for each sample space, namely the choice made in the budget/price situation at 
issue. Nonparametric tests to check whether a sample comes from a uniform distribution 
have been developed in medical statistics to assess whether a disease is uniformly distrib-
uted among the population of a given region.21 By adapting these medical tests to the envi-
ronment studied by consumer theory, it seems in principle possible to construct a test to 
check whether human subjects choose at random, at least in certain circumstances. One 
may in fact imagine that in awkward choice situations, e.g. when the available alternatives 
are numerous or it is difficult to evaluate and compare them, a nonparametric statistical test 
could validate the random-choice model. More generally, it would be interesting to investi-
gate whether there are specific classes of situations for which the random-choice model ex-
plains consumer behavior better than RCT. 
Unfortunately, as far as we know the issues concerning the construction and use of a spe-
cific test for the random-choice hypothesis have not been investigated in the literature. In 
our opinion this state of affairs depends on the widespread understanding of the as-if de-
fense of RCT in its weak sense. As far as the only question at stake is weather RCT pro-
vides a possible explanation of demand behavior, the tests will be aimed at falsifying or 
validating RCT, that is, the tests will be constructed by positing RCT as the only null hy-
pothesis. It is only if one wants to make a strong case for RCT and show that it offers the 
best explanation of consumer behavior, that tests with different null hypotheses will be in-
vestigated. 
Finally, the experiments suggest that policy makers should be careful in using RCT as a 
                                                 
21
 On this kind of statistical inference, see for instance Ripley 1988. 
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basis for consumer demand policies, for instance if they endeavor to induce people to drink 
less alcohol, quit smoking or consume healthier food. In the first place the experimental 
findings support at best almost-RCT, and it is not even clear in which contexts almost-RCT 
works and in which ones it does not. Moreover, the experimental support to RCT is a weak 
one, in the specific sense that the experiments do not show that RCT provides the best ex-
planation of demand behavior but only a possible explanation. Given these findings, one 
wonders whether policies that set aside the rationality assumption may sometimes perform 
better than RCT-based policies. For instance, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their re-
cent book Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008) show that policies which exploit the cognitive limitations of individuals and 
the framing effects on human choice can be much more effective in influencing consumer 
demand behavior than RCT policies based on incentives. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has discussed RCT and the as-if defense of it through a methodological analysis 
of a series of recent experiments that employ the random-choice model as an alternative 
hypothesis in testing whether consumer demand behavior validates RCT. 
A first, remarkable result of these experiments is that consumers frequently violate RCT, so 
that the claim that human choices can be seen as if generated by utility maximization loses 
ground. At best the laboratory findings support the weaker version of RCT we have called 
“almost-RCT”. Comparison of the different studies also shows that the number of viola-
tions varies widely across experiments, which in turn suggests that the explanatory power 
of RCT is context dependent and hence less general than previously believed. There is cur-
rently no meta-theory identifying the contexts and conditions in which RCT performs poor-
ly as opposed to those in which it does well, so that further research on the cognitive and 
environmental factors that may play a role in this respect is needed. 
In relation to Becker’s path-breaking article of 1962, the experiments confirm the limited 
applicability of his claim that RCT and random choice may lead to equivalent outcomes. 
Indeed Becker’s convergence results hold only if one is interested in aggregate rather than 
individual demand and concentrates on the expected or average outcome of random choice. 
In contrast, the experimentalists were interested in individual rather than aggregate con-
sumer demand so that they counted each and every choice; when this is done it is apparent 
that random agents frequently violate RCT. Generally speaking, RCT and random choice 
appear today as two divergent models of choice whose behavioral implications differ con-
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siderably. 
In some experiments the proportion of human subjects and random agents who violate RCT 
is rather close. Though striking at first glance, this result does not imply that in these ex-
perimental situations the random-choice model explains human demand behavior better 
than RCT, for human subjects and random agents may violate RCT in very different ways. 
The literature under review does not explore whether random choice could provide a good 
explanation of human demand behavior, because it only uses random choice to check the 
power of the test for RCT: if random agents pass the test, the fact that also human subjects 
pass it can be attributed to some extrinsic factor rather than human rationality. In order to 
study the explanatory power of the random-choice model one would need instead to con-
struct a specific test that posits it as the null hypothesis under scrutiny. The methodological 
and theoretical issues concerning the construction of such a test have not been investigated 
in the existing literature and are open to future research. 
Finally, the experiments show that the prevailing as-if defense of RCT has remained a weak 
one, and that in this sense there has been little progress from Becker’s 1962 article. The 
standard as-if defense only states that RCT offers a possible as-if explanation of demand 
behavior, and does not attempt to make the strong case that RCT provides the best explana-
tion among the available ones. The latter point is particularly relevant when policy issues 
are at stake. If RCT and the random-choice model offer two possible as-if explanations of 
demand behavior, it is not clear what kind of policy would prove more effective in influ-
encing consumer demand. Because the experimental research reviewed here has never 
tested the explanatory power of random choice and never compared it to RCT, at present 
this question remains unsolved. 
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